In his classic formulation, Charles Liebman distinguished these camps by differentiating between Orthodoxy as a religion (or "church") and Orthodoxy as a sect 1 Recent scholarship by people like Samuel Heilman and especially Adam Ferziger has demonstrated how these divisions are collapsing, however, as Modern Orthodoxy "slides to the Right" (in Heilman's words) and ultra-Orthodoxy more confidently engages with broader society, focusing less on delegitimizing other Jewish denominations and more on policing its own borders-for example, denying the legitimacy of groups like the Open Orthodox (a ritually progressive Orthodox movement founded by Rabbi Avi Weiss) and fighting against the acceptance of gay partnerships or female clerical leaders 2 While Modern-Orthodox and ultra-Orthodox religious differences over ritual stringency and social integration are indeed collapsing as the movements increasingly pull towards each other, as Heilman and Ferziger describe, there is a broader yet less often discussed factor uniting the two groups as well: a new shared value that transcends their remaining religious differences Over the past few decades, Orthodox Jews have increasingly coalesced around an ethno-nationalist identity that embraces the political Right and its ultra-nationalist worldview-both in America and in Israel-as a religious foundation united against the threat of the cultural Left 3 This constitutes a break with the historical position of American Orthodox organizations since the 1950s and 60s, which were by-andlarge Democratic or, in other cases, expressly apolitical, especially on a national level [ ]the Modern wing of Orthodoxy-for whom respect for science and civic duty represent important values-quickly accepted the growing scientific consensus and government directives that synagogue services, celebrations, funerals, and other mass gatherings must immediately stop [ ]the Black Lives Matter protests exposed continued differences between the Modern Orthodox and Haredi communities

中文翻译：

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“举手！不要开枪！我们想要夏令营！”：COVID-19 时代的正统犹太人和黑人的命也是命

在他的经典表述中，查尔斯·利伯曼通过区分作为宗教（或“教会”）的东正教和作为教派的东正教来区分这些阵营。 塞缪尔·海尔曼（Samuel Heilman），尤其是亚当·费齐格（Adam Ferziger）等人最近的奖学金证明了这些分歧是如何瓦解的，但是，随着现代正统派“向右滑动”（用海尔曼的话说）和极端正统派更自信地与更广泛的社会接触，更少关注使其他犹太教派合法化，而更多地关注监管自己的边界——例如，否认 Open Orthodox（由拉比 Avi Weiss 创立的仪式上进步的东正教运动）等团体的合法性，并反对接受同性恋伙伴关系或女性神职人员领袖 2 而现代正统派和极端正统派在仪式严格性和社会融合方面的宗教差异正如 Heilman 和 Ferziger 所描述的，随着运动越来越相互拉近，确实正在崩溃，还有一个更广泛但不太常被讨论的因素将这两个群体联合起来：一种新的共享价值，它超越了他们剩余的宗教差异 在过去的几十年里，正统犹太人越来越多地围绕着一种民族主义认同，这种认同在美国和以色列都拥护政治右派及其极端民族主义世界观，作为团结起来反对文化左派威胁的宗教基础 3 这构成了与历史的决裂1950 年代和 60 年代以来美国东正教组织的立场，这些组织大体上是民主党的，或者在其他情况下，明确与政治无关，尤其是在国家层面 [ ] 东正教的现代派——对他们来说，尊重科学和公民义务代表了重要的价值观- 迅速接受越来越多的科学共识和政府指令，即犹太教堂服务、庆祝活动、葬礼、和其他群众集会必须立即停止 [ ] 黑人的命也是命的抗议活动暴露了现代东正教和哈雷迪社区之间的持续分歧