For many of the moral beliefs we hold, we know that other people hold moral beliefs that contradict them. If you think that moral beliefs can be correct or incorrect, what difference should your awareness of others’ disagreement make to your conviction that you, and not those who think otherwise, have the correct belief? Are there circumstances in which an awareness of others’ disagreement should lead you to suspend a moral belief? If so, what are they, and why? This paper argues that three principles, taken together, give us a good answer to these questions; that they license a form of provisional moral self-trust; and that they reveal an interestingly distinctive form of pragmatic encroachment in relation to the epistemic standards governing moral belief.

对于我们持有的许多道德信念，我们知道其他人持有与他们相矛盾的道德信念。如果您认为道德信念可以是正确的或不正确的，那么您对他人不同意见的认识与您的信念有什么区别，而不是那些有不同看法的人拥有正确的信念？在某些情况下，意识到他人的不同意见会导致您暂停道德信念吗？如果是，它们是什么，为什么？本文认为，将三个原则结合起来，可以很好地回答这些问题；他们许可某种形式的临时道德自信心；并且它们揭示了一种有趣的独特形式的实用主义侵占与支配道德信仰的认知标准有关。