ABSTRACT

This paper questions the assumption that performance measures inevitably lead to gaming behaviours. Using (and extending) Patrick’s Perverse Policing Model, the rise and fall of out of court disposals (OOCDs) from 2000–2020 – especially penalty notices for disorder – is assessed in light of the introduction and removal of the offences brought to justice target (in place from 2002–2008) and the Best Use of Stop and Search Scheme (BUSSS, in place from 2014). All four forms of gaming set out in the Perverse Policing Model were found with regard to the offences brought to justice target and a fifth form, materialising, was added to the model. However, gaming was not apparent in the use of OOCDs post-BUSSS. Reasons for this difference are considered. Namely, distinction is drawn between performance targets and performance measures. It is argued that all performance measures begin life as presentational rules. They either remain as such or become enabling (encouraging gaming) or inhibitory (encouraging compliance) depending on which response attracts the least ‘within the job’ trouble. This paper draws on national statistics on OOCD use from 2000–2020, a case study on one force’s use of PNDs from 2010–2011 and exploratory data on positive outcomes following stop and search from July 2015–December 2020. These varied datasets allow for a detailed consideration of how these powers have been used in practice, the various opportunities afforded for gaming by OOCDs and an exploration of why those opportunities are, and are not, realised.

摘要

本文质疑绩效衡量不可避免地会导致游戏行为的假设。使用（并扩展）Patrick 的反常警务模型，根据引入和消除被绳之以法的罪行目标（ 2002-2008 年实施）和最佳使用停止和搜索计划（BUSSS，2014 年实施）。针对被绳之以法的犯罪目标，发现了不正当警务模型中列出的所有四种形式的博弈，并在模型中添加了第五种形式，即物质化。然而，在 BUSSS 之后使用 OOCD 时，游戏并不明显。考虑了造成这种差异的原因。即，在绩效目标和绩效衡量之间进行了区分。有人认为，所有绩效衡量标准都是从表现规则开始的。他们要么保持原样，要么成为启用（鼓励游戏）或抑制（鼓励顺从）取决于哪种反应在“工作中”引起的麻烦最少。本文借鉴了 2000-2020 年 OOCD 使用的国家统计数据、2010-2011 年一支部队使用 PND 的案例研究以及 2015 年 7 月至 2020 年 12 月停止和搜索后积极结果的探索性数据。这些不同的数据集允许详细考虑如何在实践中使用这些权力，OOCD 为游戏提供的各种机会，以及探索这些机会为什么会实现和没有实现的原因。