We study manufacturer encroachment in a supply chain in which there is partial substitution between the retailer's store brand and the manufacturer's national brand. Manufacturer encroachment and the store brand's substitution effect lead to several implications for the manufacturer and the retailer. We use a game-theoretic model to analyze the optimal decisions of the manufacturer and the retailer. In the absence of a store brand, it is well established that the retailer can benefit from manufacturer encroachment. However, our analysis reveals that (i) the retailer will not benefit from manufacturer encroachment when the national brand and the store brand are close substitutes, (ii) the substitution effect from the store brand can stifle the manufacturer's direct selling quantity and can impede the manufacturer encroachment, (iii) the coexistence of manufacturer encroachment and store brands may lead to a win-win-win outcome for the manufacturer, the retailer, and the consumer.

我们研究了供应链中的制造商侵占，其中零售商的商店品牌和制造商的国家品牌之间存在部分替代。制造商的侵占和商店品牌的替代效应对制造商和零售商产生了若干影响。我们使用博弈论模型来分析制造商和零售商的最优决策。在没有商店品牌的情况下，零售商可以从制造商的侵占中受益，这一点已是众所周知。然而，我们的分析表明，(i) 当民族品牌和商店品牌是接近的替代品时，零售商不会从制造商的侵占中受益，(ii) 商店品牌的替代效应会扼杀制造商的直销数量，并可能阻碍制造商的直销。制造商侵占，