We find that in general, both accrual-based and real earnings management decrease after the passage of shareholder-sponsored governance proposals. However, when accounting for the type of proposal, we observe significant heterogeneity in the effects on earnings management. Specifically, proposals focused on changing the governance structure (e.g., board independence) lead to reductions in both types of earnings management, whereas proposals specifically targeted at improving financial reporting quality lead to decreased accrual-based earnings management but increased real earnings management. The results suggest that constraints on accrual-based earnings management induce a shift toward real earnings management. Our paper indicates that the nature of the shareholder proposal has a significant impact on shareholder intervention.

我们发现，一般而言，在股东发起的治理提案通过后，基于权责发生制和实际盈余管理都减少了。然而，在考虑提案类型时，我们观察到对盈余管理影响的显着异质性。具体而言，专注于改变治理结构（例如，董事会独立性）的提案会导致两种类型的盈余管理减少，而专门针对提高财务报告质量的提案导致基于权责发生制的盈余管理减少，但实际盈余管理增加。结果表明，对基于权责发生制的盈余管理的限制会导致向实际盈余管理的转变。我们的论文表明，股东提案的性质对股东干预有重大影响。