Managerial career concerns could affect firm efficiency through financial reporting quality, but this important link has received relatively little attention in the literature. The present study examines this link by developing a model that has the following elements. A risk-neutral manager provides effort to increase the market value of the firm and to favorably influence the market assessment of the manager's ability. Depending on the magnitude of career concerns, the manager either underinvests or overinvests effort relative to an efficiency-maximizing level. The analysis identifies conditions under which higher-quality reporting induces the manager to invest more effort. Under these conditions, the model is extended to a setting in which the manager also chooses the quality of financial reporting at some cost. In doing so, managers seek to reduce distortion in their effort investment. The equilibrium reporting quality and effort investment are determined by a trade-off between them. In the presence of high uncertainty about the firm's future cash flows, if the manager's career concerns exceed a threshold the manager underinvests in reporting quality and overinvests effort. The empirical implication is a negative relation between managerial career concerns and financial reporting quality. To a large extent, this is consistent with findings in prior empirical studies. Thus, the present study offers a theoretical explanation for the empirical findings as an equilibrium outcome.

中文翻译：

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职业问题和财务报告质量*

管理职业问题可能会通过财务报告质量影响公司效率，但这一重要环节在文献中受到的关注相对较少。本研究通过开发具有以下元素的模型来检验这种联系。风险中性经理努力提高公司的市场价值，并对经理能力的市场评估产生有利影响。根据职业问题的严重程度，经理相对于效率最大化水平要么投资不足，要么过度投资。该分析确定了更高质量的报告促使经理投入更多努力的条件。在这些条件下，该模型扩展到经理也以一定成本选择财务报告质量的环境。在这样做，管理者寻求减少他们的努力投资中的扭曲。均衡报告质量和努力投资由它们之间的权衡决定。在公司未来现金流存在高度不确定性的情况下，如果经理的职业担忧超过某个阈值，则经理对报告质量的投资不足，而过度投资。实证意义是管理职业关注与财务报告质量之间存在负相关关系。这在很大程度上与以往实证研究的结果一致。因此，本研究为作为均衡结果的实证结果提供了理论解释。在公司未来现金流存在高度不确定性的情况下，如果经理的职业担忧超过某个阈值，则经理对报告质量的投资不足，而过度投资。实证意义是管理职业关注与财务报告质量之间存在负相关关系。这在很大程度上与以往实证研究的结果一致。因此，本研究为作为均衡结果的实证结果提供了理论解释。在公司未来现金流存在高度不确定性的情况下，如果经理的职业担忧超过某个阈值，则经理对报告质量的投资不足，而过度投资。实证意义是管理职业关注与财务报告质量之间存在负相关关系。这在很大程度上与以往实证研究的结果一致。因此，本研究为作为均衡结果的实证结果提供了理论解释。这与先前实证研究的结果一致。因此，本研究为作为均衡结果的实证结果提供了理论解释。这与先前实证研究的结果一致。因此，本研究为作为均衡结果的实证结果提供了理论解释。