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Large Shareholder Portfolio Diversification and Voluntary Disclosure*
Contemporary Accounting Research ( IF 3.2 ) Pub Date : 2021-06-18 , DOI: 10.1111/1911-3846.12707
Herita Akamah 1 , Sydney Qing Shu 2
Affiliation  

Although large shareholders have sufficient influence to engage privately with management, extant literature provides inconclusive evidence on the relation between large equity positions and corporate disclosure. This study examines whether large shareholders' portfolio diversification affects voluntary corporate disclosure. We define diversification as the extent to which investors spread investments among portfolio stocks. We predict that holding a diversified portfolio deters large shareholders from incurring the costs of private information gathering about a portfolio firm. We document that firms provide more voluntary disclosure when their large shareholders hold a more diversified portfolio, consistent with investors relying more on public disclosure about portfolio firms when their portfolio diversification is higher. Evidence from cross-sectional analyses suggests that, as predicted, the positive relation between portfolio diversification and voluntary disclosure is weaker as the net benefit of acquiring private information increases for large shareholders (i.e., when portfolio firms are more connected, have alternative information channels, or are more complex). Overall, our results suggest that diversified large shareholders' preference for a richer public disclosure environment creates a positive externality of lowering the information costs for external stakeholders without private access to management.

中文翻译:

大股东投资组合多元化和自愿披露*

尽管大股东有足够的影响力与管理层私下接触,但现有文献对大股东持股与公司披露之间的关系提供了不确定的证据。本研究考察了大股东的投资组合多元化是否会影响企业自愿披露。我们将多元化定义为投资者在投资组合股票之间分散投资的程度。我们预测,持有多元化的投资组合会阻止大股东承担收集有关投资组合公司的私人信息的成本。我们记录了当大股东持有更多元化的投资组合时,公司会提供更多的自愿披露,这与投资者在投资组合多元化程度更高时更多地依赖投资组合公司的公开披露是一致的。横断面分析的证据表明,正如预测的那样,随着大股东获取私人信息的净收益增加(即,当投资组合公司之间的联系更紧密时,有替代的信息渠道,或更复杂)。总体而言,我们的研究结果表明,多元化的大股东对更丰富的公开披露环境的偏好创造了一个积极的外部性,即降低了外部利益相关者的信息成本,而无需私人访问管理层。当投资组合公司之间的联系更紧密、有替代的信息渠道或更复杂时)。总体而言,我们的研究结果表明,多元化的大股东对更丰富的公开披露环境的偏好创造了一个积极的外部性,即降低了外部利益相关者的信息成本,而无需私人访问管理层。当投资组合公司之间的联系更紧密、有替代的信息渠道或更复杂时)。总体而言,我们的研究结果表明,多元化的大股东对更丰富的公开披露环境的偏好创造了一个积极的外部性,即降低了外部利益相关者的信息成本,而无需私人访问管理层。
更新日期:2021-06-18
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