This paper seeks to develop a phenomenological account of the disorientation of grief, specifically the relationship between disorientation and the breakdown in practical self-understanding at the heart of grief. I argue that this breakdown cannot be sufficiently understood as a breakdown of formerly shared practices and habitual patterns of navigating lived-in space that leaves the bereaved individual at a loss as to how to go on. Examining the experience of losing a loved person and a loved person-to-be, I instead propose that this breakdown should be understood primarily in relation to a distinctive kind of futurity operative in disorientation, irrespective of the extent to which there is a breakdown of formerly shared practices and habitual patterns of navigating lived-in space. Drawing on the resources afforded by Heidegger’s phenomenology, I argue that it is a core characteristic of the experience of disorientation in grief that the grieving person can no longer meaningfully press ahead into a specific futural self. This view comes with certain advantages over existing accounts of the temporality of grief for making sense of the disorientated relationship to futurity, which the appeal to Heideggerian resources makes possible.

本文试图对悲伤的迷失方向进行现象学解释，特别是迷失方向与悲伤核心的实际自我理解崩溃之间的关系。我认为，这种崩溃不能被充分理解为以前共享的实践和在居住空间中导航的习惯模式的崩溃，这让失去亲人的人不知如何继续下去。审视失去所爱之人和未来之人的经历，我建议应该将这种崩溃主要理解为一种在迷失方向中运作的独特未来，不管以前共享的实践和在居住空间中导航的习惯模式崩溃的程度。利用海德格尔现象学提供的资源，我认为悲伤中迷失方向体验的一个核心特征是，悲伤的人不能再有意义地推进特定的未来自我。这种观点与现有的关于悲伤的时间性的解释相比具有某些优势，可以理解与未来的迷失方向的关系，而对海德格尔资源的诉求使之成为可能。