Abstract

As the driving force of the evolutionary game, the strategy update mechanism is crucial to the evolution of cooperative behavior. At present, there has been a lot of research on the update mechanism, which mainly involves two aspects. On one hand, all players in the network use the same rule to update strategies; on the other hand, players use heterogeneous update rules, such as imitate and innovate. A sophisticated update mechanism is available. However, most of these studies are based on node dynamics, that is, individuals adopt the same strategy to their neighbors at the same time. Considering that in real life, faced with complex social relationships, the code of conduct generally followed by individuals is to adopt different decision-making behaviors for different opponents. Therefore, here, we are based on edge dynamics, which allows each player to adopt different strategies for different opponents. We analyze how the mixing ratio of the two mechanisms in the network affects the evolution of cooperative behavior based on imitation and myopic. The parameter u is introduced to represent the proportion of myopic players. The simulation results show that in the edge dynamics behavior patterns, compared with the myopic rule, the imitate rule plays a leading role in promoting the group to achieve a high level of cooperation, even when the temptation to defect is relatively large. Furthermore, for players who adopt the imitate update mechanism, individuals with high cooperation rate dominate when u is relatively high, and individuals with low cooperation rate dominate when u is relatively large. For players who adopt the myopic update rule, regardless of the value of u, the individual’s cooperation rate is 0.25 and 0.5 is dominant.

Graphic abstract

中文翻译：

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近视策略组中高度合作个体的聚集性

摘要

作为演化博弈的驱动力，策略更新机制对合作行为的演化至关重要。目前，关于更新机制的研究很多，主要涉及两个方面。一方面，网络中的所有玩家都使用相同的规则来更新策略；另一方面，玩家使用异构更新规则，例如模仿和创新。可以使用复杂的更新机制。然而，这些研究大多基于节点动力学，即个体同时对其邻居采取相同的策略。考虑到现实生活中，面对复杂的社会关系，个人普遍遵循的行为准则是​​针对不同的对手采取不同的决策行为。因此，在这里，我们基于边缘动力学，这允许每个玩家针对不同的对手采取不同的策略。我们分析了网络中两种机制的混合比例如何影响基于模仿和近视的合作行为的演变。参数引入u代表近视玩家的比例。仿真结果表明，在边缘动力学行为模式中，与短视规则相比，模仿规则在促进群体实现高水平合作方面起主导作用，即使在背叛的诱惑相对较大的情况下。此外，对于采用模仿更新机制的玩家，当u较大时，合作率高的个体占优势，u较大时，合作率低的个体占优势。对于采用近视更新规则的玩家，无论u值如何，个人的配合率为0.25，0.5为优势。

图形摘要