This article discusses why it is the case that we refuse to accept strange evaluative claims as being true in fictions, even though we are happy to go along with other types of absurdities in such contexts. For instance, we would refuse to accept the following statement as true, even in the context of a fiction: (i) In killing her baby, Giselda did the right thing; after all, it was a girl.This article offers a sensibilist diagnosis of this puzzle, inspired by an observation first made by David Hume. According to sensibilism, the way we feel about things settles their evaluative properties. Thus, when confronted with a fictional scenario where the configuration of non-evaluative facts and properties is relevantly similar to the actual world, we refuse to go along with evaluative properties being instantiated according to a different pattern. It is the attitudes we hold in the actual world that fix the extension of evaluative terms, even in nonactual worlds. When engaging with a fiction, we (to some extent) leave our beliefs about what the world is like behind, while taking our emotional attitudes with us into the fiction.To substantiate this diagnosis, this paper outlines a sensibilist semantics for evaluative terms based on recent discussion regarding predicates of personal taste, and explains how, together with standard assumptions about the nature of fictional discourse, it makes the relevant predictions with respect to engagement with fictions.

中文翻译：

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对想象力抵抗的感性解释

本文讨论了为什么我们拒绝接受奇怪的评价性主张在小说中是真实的，即使我们很乐意在这种情况下接受其他类型的荒谬。例如，即使在虚构的背景下，我们也会拒绝接受以下陈述的真实性： (i) 在杀死她的孩子时，吉塞尔达做了正确的事；毕竟，那是一个女孩。这篇文章对这个谜题提供了一个感性的诊断，灵感来自于大卫休谟的观察。根据感性主义，我们对事物的感觉决定了它们的评价属性。因此，当面对非评估事实和属性的配置与现实世界相关的虚构场景时，我们拒绝接受根据不同模式实例化评估属性。正是我们在现实世界中持有的态度决定了评价术语的外延，即使在非现实世界中也是如此。当与小说打交道时，我们（在某种程度上）将我们对世界是什么样子的信念抛在脑后，同时将我们的情感态度带入小说中。为了证实这一诊断，本文概述了基于最近关于个人品味谓词的讨论，并解释了如何与关于虚构话语性质的标准假设一起，就与虚构的接触做出相关预测。