How do firms alter their strategic actions when targeted by different types of activist shareholders? We argue that hedge fund activists threaten firms in ways that lead them to conserve resources and to scale back and simplify their strategic actions, which refer to long-run competitive actions requiring substantial investment. By comparison, corporate shareholder activists bestow firms with new resources and freedoms that increase their flexibility to expand and complexify their strategic actions. Using a matched sample and difference-in-differences methodology, we find support for our theory: Firms targeted by hedge fund activists decrease the intensity and complexity of their strategic actions, while firms targeted by corporate shareholder activists increase the intensity and complexity of those actions. Our study contributes to research on shareholder governance and competitive dynamics by highlighting the differential effects of activist shareholders on targeted firms’ strategic actions.

面对不同类型的维权股东，公司如何改变其战略行动？我们认为，对冲基金激进分子以导致公司节约资源、缩减和简化战略行动的方式威胁公司，这些战略行动是指需要大量投资的长期竞争行动。相比之下，公司股东积极分子赋予公司新的资源和自由，以增加其扩展和复杂化战略行动的灵活性。使用匹配的样本和差异中的差异方法，我们为我们的理论找到了支持：对冲基金激进主义者所针对的公司降低了其战略行动的强度和复杂性，而公司股东激进主义者所针对的公司则增加了这些行动的强度和复杂性.