The human is considered as the important link in the phishing attack, and the e-mail security provider encourages users to report suspicious e-mails. However, evidence suggests that reporting is scarce. Therefore, we study how to motivate users to report phishing e-mails in this paper. To solve the problem, a tripartite evolutionary game model among e-mail security providers, e-mail users, and attackers is constructed. We obtain the desired evolutionary stable strategy through solving the replicator dynamics equations. Moreover, the evolution process to the desired evolutionary stable strategy is derived, which can guide the e-mail security provider to make a reasonable incentive mechanism. Lastly, we experiment with a large real-world e-mail network. The experiment results show that our model is effective and practical.

中文翻译：

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基于三方演化博弈模型的钓鱼邮件举报激励机制

人是钓鱼攻击的重要环节，邮件安全提供商鼓励用户举报可疑邮件。然而，证据表明报告很少。因此，我们在本文中研究了如何激励用户报告网络钓鱼电子邮件。为解决该问题，构建了电子邮件安全提供者、电子邮件用户和攻击者三方演化博弈模型。我们通过求解复制器动力学方程来获得所需的进化稳定策略。此外，推导出了向期望的演化稳定策略的演化过程，可以指导电子邮件安全提供者制定合理的激励机制。最后，我们用一个大型现实世界的电子邮件网络进行试验。实验结果表明我们的模型是有效和实用的。