Trish Glazebrook and Dana Belu both think I spend too much time criticizing the Cartesianism that both empirical and transcendental philosophies of technology quite obviously oppose. They argue that I would have been better off if I had instead considered how these two philosophies “converge on the thesis of crisis” in technoscientific life (Glazebrook) and/or “made wider use of Feenberg’s work” (Belu). While I am sympathetic to both Glazebrook’s thesis and Feenberg’s work, I argue that their recommendations raise precisely the “pre-philosophical” issue I discuss in my paper. The issue, addressed directly by both Nietzsche and the young Heidegger, is how such recommendations can be carried forward as productive, life-driven articulations of our current needs in technoscientific times and not just become two more in a long string of chosen (and thus very Cartesian) “turns” in a history of philosophical “positions.”

Trish Glazebrook 和 Dana Belu 都认为我花了太多时间批评笛卡尔主义，而经验主义和先验技术哲学显然都反对。他们争辩说，如果我转而考虑这两种哲学如何在技术科学生活（Glazebrook）和/或“更广泛地利用 Feenberg 的工作”（Belu）中“融合在危机论上”，我会过得更好。虽然我对 Glazebrook 的论文和 Feenberg 的工作表示同情，但我认为他们的建议恰恰提出了我在论文中讨论的“前哲学”问题。尼采和年轻的海德格尔都直接解决的问题是，如何将这些建议作为富有成效的、