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Passivity-Based Robust Control Against Quantified False Data Injection Attacks in Cyber-Physical Systems
IEEE/CAA Journal of Automatica Sinica ( IF 11.8 ) Pub Date : 2021-06-17 , DOI: 10.1109/jas.2021.1004012
Yue Zhao , Ze Chen , Chunjie Zhou , Yu-Chu Tian , Yuanqing Qin

Secure control against cyber attacks becomes increasingly significant in cyber-physical systems (CPSs). False data injection attacks are a class of cyber attacks that aim to compromise CPS functions by injecting false data such as sensor measurements and control signals. For quantified false data injection attacks, this paper establishes an effective defense framework from the energy conversion perspective. Then, we design an energy controller to dynamically adjust the system energy changes caused by unknown attacks. The designed energy controller stabilizes the attacked CPSs and ensures the dynamic performance of the system by adjusting the amount of damping injection. Moreover, with the $L_{2}$ disturbance attenuation technique, the burden of control system design is simplified because there is no need to design an attack observer. In addition, this secure control method is simple to implement because it avoids complicated mathematical operations. The effectiveness of our control method is demonstrated through an industrial CPS that controls a permanent magnet synchronous motor.

中文翻译:

网络物理系统中针对量化虚假数据注入攻击的基于被动的鲁棒控制

在网络物理系统 (CPS) 中,针对网络攻击的安全控制变得越来越重要。虚假数据注入攻击是一类网络攻击,旨在通过注入虚假数据(例如传感器测量值和控制信号)来破坏 CPS 功能。针对量化的虚假数据注入攻击,本文从能量转换的角度建立了有效的防御框架。然后,我们设计了一个能量控制器来动态调整未知攻击引起的系统能量变化。设计的能量控制器通过调节阻尼注入量来稳定受攻击的CPS并确保系统的动态性能。此外,随着$L_{2}$干扰衰减技术,由于无需设计攻击观测器,因此简化了控制系统设计的负担。此外,这种安全控制方法易于实现,因为它避免了复杂的数学运算。我们的控制方法的有效性通过控制永磁同步电机的工业 CPS 得到证明。
更新日期:2021-06-18
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