We consider a two-echelon supply chain network where the downstream retailers procure products from the upstream unreliable suppliers to sell in the end market. In the decentralized setting, the suppliers consider whether to enter the market and simultaneously set their wholesale prices if they enter, and then the retailers make ordering decisions and engage in quantity-based Cournot competition in the end market where each retailer can sell exactly the products purchased from the supplier. We analyze the system as a Stackelberg game where the suppliers are the leaders and the retailers are the followers. For the case where the random yields of the suppliers are independent, we derive the unique equilibrium of the game in which the suppliers with higher reliability set higher wholesale prices and obtain more profits. We then coordinate the supply chain with the spanning revenue-sharing (SRS) contract and derive the conditions under which the SRS contract achieves the win-win outcome, i.e., all the members of the supply chain network sign a single revenue-sharing contract together. Then considering the case where the random yields are correlated, we show that some suppliers may not join the game in equilibrium even if all the suppliers have the same purchasing cost. Moreover, we show that a high correlation of supplier defaults dampens suppliers’ competition, which differs from the finding in the extant literature because we consider price-sensitive demand.

我们考虑一个两梯队的供应链网络，下游零售商从上游不可靠的供应商那里采购产品在终端市场销售。在去中心化的环境中，供应商考虑是否进入市场，进入时同时设定批发价格，然后零售商做出订货决策，在终端市场进行基于数量的古诺竞争，每个零售商都可以准确地销售产品。从供应商处购买。我们将系统分析为 Stackelberg 博弈，其中供应商是领导者，零售商是追随者。对于供应商的随机产量独立的情况，我们推导出了博弈的唯一均衡，其中可靠性较高的供应商设定更高的批发价格并获得更多利润。然后我们用跨越收益分享（SRS）合同协调供应链，推导出SRS合同实现双赢的条件，即供应链网络的所有成员共同签署一份收益分享合同. 然后考虑随机产量相关的情况，我们表明即使所有供应商的采购成本相同，一些供应商也可能不会在均衡状态下加入博弈。此外，我们表明供应商违约的高度相关性会抑制供应商的竞争，这与现有文献中的发现不同，因为我们考虑了价格敏感的需求。供应链网络的所有成员共同签署一份收益分享合同。然后考虑随机产量相关的情况，我们表明即使所有供应商的采购成本相同，一些供应商也可能不会在均衡状态下加入博弈。此外，我们表明供应商违约的高度相关性会抑制供应商的竞争，这与现有文献中的发现不同，因为我们考虑了价格敏感的需求。供应链网络的所有成员共同签署一份收益分享合同。然后考虑随机产量相关的情况，我们表明即使所有供应商的采购成本相同，一些供应商也可能不会在均衡状态下加入博弈。此外，我们表明供应商违约的高度相关性会抑制供应商的竞争，这与现有文献中的发现不同，因为我们考虑了价格敏感的需求。