Evidence from psychology and marketing suggests that those who make a “precise” first offer in bargaining get a better deal than those who make a “round” first offer. We report on a series of experiments designed to test for and improve our understanding of the “precise first offer” (PFO) effect in bargaining and whether it likely reflects rational optimizing or equilibrium behavior. Our experiment varies whether decisions are incentivized and whether the PFO effect can emerge as an equilibrium of a cheap-talk signaling game. We find evidence of a PFO effect when subjects read a vignette and make unincentivized individual decisions. When monetary incentives are added to the vignette, we still find the PFO effect, but it is not robust. In a bilateral bargaining situation with a cheap-talk equilibrium, we can not find the PFO effect, which is inconsistent with the equilibrium predictions. Moreover, the PFO effect reemerges in a setting in which initial offers are generated by a random device and thus provides a strong refutation of the signaling model. Our evidence suggests that optimizing and equilibrium accounts of the PFO effect are inadequate. Understanding initial offers as reference points, which subtly change perceptions about the kinds of acceptable counteroffers, provides a plausible account of a new finding on which prior explanations are silent: precise offers induce more precise counteroffers.

来自心理学和市场营销的证据表明，那些在讨价还价中“准确”先出价的人比那些“全面”先出价的人获得了更好的交易。我们报告了一系列实验，旨在测试和提高我们对讨价还价中“精确优先报价”（PFO）效应的理解，以及它是否可能反映理性优化或均衡行为。我们的实验会改变决策是否受到激励以及 PFO 效应是否可以作为廉价谈话信号游戏的均衡出现。当受试者阅读小插图并做出无动机的个人决定时，我们发现了 PFO 效应的证据。当在小插图中添加金钱激励时，我们仍然发现 PFO 效应，但它并不稳健。在具有廉价谈话均衡的双边谈判情况下，我们找不到 PFO 效应，这与均衡预测不一致。此外，在初始报价由随机设备生成的环境中，PFO 效应再次出现，从而为信号模型提供了强有力的反驳。我们的证据表明，对 PFO 效应的优化和均衡解释是不够的。将初始报价理解为参考点，这会微妙地改变对可接受的还价种类的看法，为先前的解释沉默的新发现提供了合理的解释：精确的报价会导致更精确的还价。我们的证据表明，对 PFO 效应的优化和均衡解释是不够的。将初始报价理解为参考点，这会微妙地改变对可接受的还价种类的看法，为先前的解释沉默的新发现提供了合理的解释：精确的报价会导致更精确的还价。我们的证据表明，对 PFO 效应的优化和均衡解释是不够的。将初始报价理解为参考点，这会微妙地改变对可接受的还价种类的看法，为先前的解释沉默的新发现提供了合理的解释：精确的报价会导致更精确的还价。