This paper defends the claim that pragmatic encroachment—the idea that knowledge is sensitive to the practical stakes of believing—can explain a distinctive kind of epistemic injustice: the injustice that occurs when prejudice causes someone to know less than they otherwise would. This encroachment injustice, as we call it, occurs when the threat of being met with prejudice raises the stakes for someone to rely on her belief when acting, by raising the level of evidential support required for knowledge. We explain this notion of encroachment injustice, connect it to the empirical literature on implicit bias, and defend it against important objections.

这篇论文捍卫了这样一种说法，即实用主义侵占——即知识对信仰的实际风险敏感的观点——可以解释一种独特的认知不公正：当偏见导致某人知道的比他们本来应该知道的少时，就会发生这种不公正。这种侵犯不公正，正如我们所说，发生在受到偏见的威胁，通过提高知识所需的证据支持水平，增加了某人在行动时依赖她的信仰的风险时。我们解释了这种侵犯不公正的概念，将其与关于隐性偏见的实证文献联系起来，并针对重要的反对意见进行辩护。