In this study, we investigate the most common forms of government grant in green start-ups, which are appropriation, interest-free bank loans, and tax subsidies. These mechanisms are used to mitigate the problem of higher research costs and sunk costs of start-ups on green innovation and help venture investors better monitor the business plan, asset use, and agency cost and regularly collect information of start-ups to retain the right to terminate financing projects and improve the efficiency of them. The aim of this work is to develop a theoretical model of the agency among the government, the venture capitalists who only pursue monetary income, the strategy investors who pursue strategic objectives and monetary income, and the entrepreneur who takes into account both the influence of different forms of government grant on entrepreneur financing at a different stage and the improved monitoring process of venture investors owe to the staged capital infusion of government. The model shows that the optimal staged financing decision is given when the first target of the government is to achieve social welfare optimization and the secondary goal of maximizing green benefits. Moreover, the model explains the optimal staged financing decision of venture investors and equity stake share in different rounds. Ultimately, we find the optimal staged financing portfolios for green start-ups to acquire venture investment, reduce the staged financing uncertainty, and help the government realize a national green innovation strategy.

中文翻译：

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政府阶段性融资选择机制最大限度发挥初创企业的绿色效益

在本研究中，我们调查了绿色初创企业中最常见的政府补助形式，即拨款、无息银行贷款和税收补贴。这些机制用于缓解初创企业在绿色创新方面的研究成本和沉没成本较高的问题，帮助风险投资者更好地监控商业计划、资产使用和代理成本，并定期收集初创企业的信息以保留权利。终止融资项目，提高项目效率。这项工作的目的是在政府、只追求货币收入的风险投资家、追求战略目标和货币收入的战略投资者之间建立一个代理的理论模型，而创业者在不同阶段兼顾不同形式的政府补助对创业者融资的影响，以及对风险投资人监控过程的完善，都归功于政府的阶段性注资。该模型表明，当政府的第一目标是实现社会福利优化，第二目标是绿色效益最大化时，给出了最优分阶段融资决策。此外，该模型解释了风险投资者在不同轮次中的最优分阶段融资决策和股权份额。最终，我们为绿色初创企业找到最优的阶段性融资组合，以获取风险投资，降低阶段性融资的不确定性，帮助政府实现国家绿色创新战略。