According to the broadly Aristotelian distinction between universals and particulars, all and only the former are capable of whole multiple location. The present essay defends this distinction against four putative counterexamples. The first two, extended simple material objects and enduring time-traveling self-meeters, putatively are wholly multiply locatable, but not universals. The second two, unique properties of point-sized entities and Platonic (i.e., not spatiotemporally located) universals, putatively are universals, but not wholly multiply locatable. The defensive strategy is to resist certain presuppositions underlying the examples.

中文翻译：

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整体多地点和普遍性

根据广义上的亚里士多德式的普遍性和特殊性之间的区分，所有且只有前者能够整体多重定位。本文针对四个假定的反例来捍卫这种区别。前两个，扩展的简单物质对象和持久的时间旅行自我满足，假定是完全多重定位的，但不是普遍的。后两个，点大小实体的独特属性和柏拉图式的（即，不是时空定位的）共相，假定是共相，但不是完全可多重定位的。防御策略是抵制示例背后的某些预设。