Recent work in iterative voting has defined the difference in social welfare between the truthful winner and worst-case equilibrium winner, due to repeated strategic manipulations, known as the additive dynamic price of anarchy (ADPoA). While all iterative plurality winners have been shown to differ from truth by at most one initial vote, it is less understood how agents' welfare changes in equilibrium. To this end, we differentiate agents' utility from their iteration mechanism and determine iterative plurality's ADPoA in the worst- and average-case. We first negatively demonstrate that the worst-case ADPoA is linear in the number of agents. In expectation, rather, equilibrium winners have a constant order welfare advantage over the truthful winner. Our positive results illustrate the prospect for social welfare to increase due to strategic manipulation.

中文翻译：

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战略行为是福：迭代投票提高社会福利

由于重复的战略操纵（称为无政府状态的附加动态价格（ADPoA）），最近在迭代投票方面的工作定义了真实赢家和最坏情况下的均衡赢家之间的社会福利差异。虽然所有迭代复数的获胜者都被证明与真理不同，但最多只有一次初始投票，但人们不太了解代理人的福利如何在均衡中变化。为此，我们将代理的效用与其迭代机制区分开来，并确定最坏和平均情况下迭代复数的 ADPoA。我们首先否定地证明最坏情况下的 ADPoA 与代理数量呈线性关系。相反，在预期中，均衡赢家比真正的赢家具有恒定的秩序福利优势。