Studies on delegation to international organizations have extensively examined the determinants of supranational delegation. Yet, systematic empirical accounts on the effects of different types and degrees of delegation on policy developments remain limited. This paper addresses this gap by using a novel dataset that combines delegation data from the Treaty of Rome with data on legislation and case law developed by the European authorities (1958–2000). The analysis produces three findings. First, a higher level of delegation of legislative and executive functions has a positive effect on the volume of secondary legislation, but no effect on the volume of case law. Second, a higher level of judicial delegation has a positive effect on the volume of case law, while limiting legislative activity. Third, the precision of the Treaty provisions constrains the volume of secondary legislation. The findings show how the type and intensity of supranational delegation shape supranational policy development.

中文翻译：

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超国家代表团对政策制定的影响

对国际组织授权的研究广泛研究了超国家授权的决定因素。然而，关于不同类型和程度的授权对政策发展的影响的系统实证研究仍然有限。本文通过使用一个新的数据集来解决这一差距，该数据集将罗马条约的授权数据与欧洲当局制定的立法和判例法数据相结合（1958 年至 2000 年）。分析产生了三个发现。首先，更高水平的立法和行政职能下放对二级立法的数量有积极影响，但对判例法的数量没有影响。其次，更高级别的司法授权对判例法的数量产生积极影响，同时限制了立法活动。第三，条约规定的精确性限制了二级立法的数量。研究结果显示了超国家代表团的类型和强度如何影响超国家政策的制定。