Perceptual disjunctivism is a controversial thesis about perception. One familiar characterization of the thesis maintains that there is no common epistemic kind that is present in both veridical and non-veridical cases of perception. For example, the good case, in which one sees a yellow lemon, and the bad case, in which one hallucinates a yellow lemon, share a specific first-person phenomenology, being indistinguishable from the first-person point of view; however, seeing a yellow lemon and hallucinating a yellow lemon do not, according to the disjunctivist, share a common epistemic kind. There are two types of disjunctivism: epistemological vs. metaphysical. John McDowell (1996, 2008, Philosophical Explorations, 13(3), 243–255, 2011, Philosophical Explorations, 16(3), 259–279, 2013) has articulated, refined, and defended one kind of disjunctivism. Tyler Burge (Philosophical Topics, 33(1), 1–78, 2005, Philosophical Explorations, 13(3), 43–80, 2011) has objected to many forms of disjunctivism, arguing that they are all inconsistent with the proximality principle (PP) in the vision sciences. PP requires an ability-general kind in common between relevantly similar perceptual states, such as seeing a yellow lemon and hallucinating a yellow lemon, which disjunctivism denies. Against the background of this debate some analytic epistemologists, such as Michael Martin (Philosophical Studies, 120, 37–89, 2004), Alan Millar (Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 73(1), 176–198, 2007), Berit Brogaard (Philosophical Issues 21-The Epistemology of Perception, 21(1), 46–73, 2011), Duncan Pritchard (2012), and Heather Logue (Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 86(1), 105–133, 2013) remain attracted to some version of disjunctivism. Brogaard and Pritchard each have gone on to articulate and defend a version. Pritchard’s (2012), for example, defends epistemological disjunctivism. Martin, Millar, and Logue, by contrast, have defended the idea that the disjunctivist is right about something, but perhaps not wholly correct about the nature of perception. In what follows, I articulate and defend the view that an interesting kind of disjunctivism is to be found through a reading of the Nyāya School of classical Indian philosophy. I articulate a version of perceptual disjunctivism informed by Nyāya perceptual theory that is not derivable from any single Nyāya philosopher. The view I offer is inspired by work on disjunctivism both in Anglo-analytic philosophy and in Nyāya scholarship, such as by Dasti and Phillips (Philosophy East & West, 60(4), 535–540, 2010), Ganeri (Philosophy East & West, 60(4), 541–550, 2010), Dasti (Philosophy East & West, 62(1), 1–15, 2012), Phillips (2012), Vaidya (Philosophy East and West, 63(4), 562–585, 2013), and Schiller (History of Philosophy Quarterly, 36(1), 1–18, 2019). Importantly, the causal account I offer is distinct from Grice’s (Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 121, 121–152, 1961) single-factor causal theory of perception by crucially involving a multi-factor causal theory of perception. My work on Nyāya perceptual theory derives primarily from Jaysankar Shaw’s (2016a, b, c) account of Nyāya on the sources of knowledge, which is distinct from Stephen Phillips’ well-known (2012) account of Nyāya epistemology. Shaw’s theory has been developed and refined through textual analysis and dialectical engagement with the twentieth century Nyāya Pundit Philosopher, Viśvabandhu Tarkatīrtha. Like other modern Nyāya scholars, such as B. K. Matilal (1992), A. Chakrabarti (Philosophy East and West, 50(1), 1–8, 2010), M. Chadha (2015), J. Ganeri (2011), and S. Phillips (Philosophy East and West, 51(1), 104–113, 2001, 2012), J. Shaw’s account shows how Nyāya epistemology is a living and continuing form of Indian philosophy. My goal here is twofold. On the one hand, I articulate multi-factor causal disjunctivism and show how it can be applied to the McDowell-Burge debate over the viability of disjunctivism and naïve realism. On the other hand, I aim to start a cross-cultural epistemological conversation with those that have contributed to the Anglo-analytic debate in anthologies, such as Haddock and Macpherson (2008), Byrne and Logue (2009), and introductions, such as Soteriou (2016). The hope is that a cross-cultural epistemological investigation into disjunctivism will lead to better epistemic theorizing about the nature of perception.

知觉分离主义是一个关于知觉的有争议的论题。该论文的一个熟悉的特征认为，在真实和非真实的感知案例中不存在共同的认知类型。例如，看到黄柠檬的好案例和产生黄色柠檬幻觉的坏案例共享特定的第一人称现象学，从第一人称的角度来看无法区分；然而，根据析取论者的说法，看到黄色柠檬和产生黄色柠檬幻觉并不具有共同的认知类型。有两种类型的分离主义：认识论与形而上学。约翰·麦克道威尔 (1996, 2008,哲学探索, 13 (3), 243–255, 2011,哲学探索, 16(3), 259–279, 2013) 阐明、提炼并捍卫了一种分离主义。Tyler Burge（Philosophical Topics, 33 (1), 1-78, 2005, Philosophical Explorations, 13 (3), 43-80, 2011）反对多种形式的分离主义，认为它们都与近端原则不一致（ PP）在视觉科学。PP 要求在相关相似的知觉状态之间具有共同的一般能力类型，例如看到黄色柠檬和产生黄色柠檬的幻觉，而析取主义否认这一点。在这场辩论的背景下，一些分析认识论者，如迈克尔·马丁（哲学研究，120，37-89，2004），艾伦·米勒（哲学和现象学研究，73(1), 176–198, 2007)、Berit Brogaard（哲学问题 21-感知的认识论，21（1）、46–73、2011）、Duncan Pritchard（2012）和 Heather Logue（哲学和现象学研究， 86(1), 105–133, 2013) 仍然被某种形式的分离主义所吸引。Brogaard 和 Pritchard 各自继续阐述和捍卫一个版本。例如，Pritchard (2012) 为认识论分离主义辩护。相比之下，Martin、Millar 和 Logue 为析取论者在某些事情上是正确的观点辩护，但在感知的本质上可能并不完全正确。在接下来的内容中，我阐明并捍卫这样一种观点，即通过阅读印度古典哲学的 Nyāya 学派可以找到一种有趣的分离主义。我阐述了一种由 Nyāya 知觉理论提供的知觉分离主义版本，它不能从任何单个 Nyāya 哲学家那里推导出来。我提供的观点受到英国分析哲学和 Nyāya 奖学金中关于分离主义的工作的启发，Philosophy East & West, 60 (4), 535–540, 2010), Ganeri ( Philosophy East & West, 60 (4), 541–550, 2010), Dasti ( Philosophy East & West, 62 (1), 1– 15, 2012)、Phillips (2012)、Vaidya（东西方哲学，63（4）、562-585、2013）和席勒（哲学史季刊，36（1）、1-18，2019）。重要的是，我提供的因果解释不同于格赖斯（亚里士多德学会会刊，121，121-152，1961）的单因素因果感知理论，关键涉及多因素知觉因果理论。我在 Nyāya 知觉理论方面的工作主要源自 Jaysankar Shaw (2016a, b, c) 关于 Nyāya 知识来源的描述，这与 Stephen Phillips (2012) 著名的 Nyāya 认识论不同。Shaw 的理论通过文本分析和与 20 世纪 Nyāya Pundit 哲学家 Viśvabandhu Tarkatīrtha 的辩证接触得到发展和完善。与其他现代 Nyāya 学者一样，例如 BK Matilal (1992)、A. Chakrabarti ( Philosophy East and West, 50 (1), 1–8, 2010)、M. Chadha (2015)、J. Ganeri (2011) 和S. Phillips（东西方哲学，51(1), 104–113, 2001, 2012)，J. Shaw 的叙述显示了 Nyāya 认识论如何成为印度哲学的一种活生生和持续的形式。我在这里的目标是双重的。一方面，我阐述了多因素因果分离主义，并展示了如何将其应用于 McDowell-Burge 关于分离主义和朴素现实主义可行性的辩论。另一方面，我的目标是与那些对选集中的盎格鲁分析辩论做出贡献的人开始跨文化的认识论对话，例如 Haddock 和 Macpherson（2008）、Byrne 和 Logue（2009），以及介绍，例如索特里奥 (2016)。希望对分离主义的跨文化认识论调查将导致关于感知本质的更好的认识论理论化。