According to Alix Cohen, Kant defines emotions as ‘feelings’. Although I find her account of Kantian feelings compelling, I provide three reasons to doubt that it is an account of emotions: (1) it is unclear why Cohen identifies emotions with Kantian feelings; (2) some Kantian feelings are not emotions; (3) some Kantian desires may be emotions. I propose, however, that with some qualifications Cohen’s account may be upheld, provided its extra-textual assumptions about emotions are explicated. Against her claim that Kantian feelings have a derived intentionality, I argue that the text is compatible with their being intrinsically intentional.

中文翻译：

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康德情绪是感觉吗？

根据阿利克斯科恩的说法，康德将情绪定义为“感觉”。尽管我发现她对康德情感的描述令人信服，但我提供了三个理由来怀疑这是对情绪的描述：（1）不清楚为什么科恩将情绪与康德的感觉联系起来；（2）一些康德的感觉不是情绪；(3) 一些康德式的欲望可能是情绪。然而，我建议，在某些条件下，科恩的说法可能会得到支持，前提是它关于情绪的文本外假设得到了解释。与她声称康德式的情感具有衍生的意向性相反，我认为文本与它们的内在意向性是相容的。