The All or Nothing Problem is a paradox developed in recent debates about effective altruism. One argues that the paradox can be resolved by rejecting some of its claims in favor of parallel conditional claims. Another contends that the correct solution to the paradox is to reject a wrong bridge principle that is assumed in it. A third draws a distinction between two moral realms, and suggests that the paradox is only of limited relevance to some assertion of effective altruism because it may not exist in certain moral realm. In this article, I argue that those solutions to (analyses of) the All or Nothing Problem is unsatisfactory, and propose an alternative solution. Firstly, I challenge their reasons for a claim in the paradox. Secondly, I propose a holist deontological solution to the All or Nothing Problem. Finally, in order to understand the true nature of the problem, I carry out an analysis of the underlying causes of its more general form.

全有或全无问题是最近关于有效利他主义的辩论中发展起来的一个悖论。有人认为，可以通过拒绝其某些主张而支持平行的有条件主张来解决悖论。另一个人争辩说，这个悖论的正确解决方案是拒绝其中假定的错误的桥梁原则。第三个对两个道德领域进行了区分，并表明该悖论与某些有效利他主义的主张的相关性有限，因为它可能不存在于某些道德领域。在本文中，我认为那些对全有或全无问题的（分析）解决方案并不令人满意，并提出了替代解决方案。首先，我质疑他们提出悖论的理由。其次，我对“全有或全无”问题提出了一个整体的道义解决方案。最后，