Abstract Retail distribution is often organized into chain stores, where geographically dispersed units operate under a common trademark and operational routines. Franchising is an organizational form chosen by entrepreneurs to manage retail chains. Previous research has maintained that franchising is a solution to “the” agency problem. This article shows how franchising solves one agency problem, shirking, but creates another, free riding, giving rise to dual agency problems. We test which has a stronger effect on performance. Using stochastic frontier estimation, a technique from empirical economics, we show that marketing spending yields less sales for franchised chains relative to owned chains, suggesting that the loss associated with free riding dominates the gain from controlling shirking. Implications for theory and practice are discussed.

中文翻译：

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零售连锁店的双重代理

摘要 零售分销通常组织成连锁店，其中地理上分散的单位在共同的商标和运营程序下运营。特许经营是企业家选择的一种管理零售连锁店的组织形式。先前的研究认为，特许经营是“代理”问题的解决方案。这篇文章展示了特许经营如何解决一个代理问题，逃避问题，但创造了另一个，搭便车，导致双重代理问题。我们测试哪个对性能有更强的影响。我们使用随机前沿估计（一种经验经济学的技术）表明，相对于自有连锁店，营销支出对特许连锁店产生的销售额较少，这表明与搭便车相关的损失在控制偷懒带来的收益中占主导地位。讨论了对理论和实践的影响。