Abstract This study examines whether the presence of an ineffective audit committee at family and non-family firms can influence the firms’ non-audit service purchases from the incumbent auditor. Using a sample of 1736 observations of UK-listed companies from 2005 to 2013, we find a significant positive association between ineffective audit committees and non-audit service fees. This association is more pronounced for family than for non-family firms, suggesting that in the UK, family firms with ineffective audit committees tend to buy more non-audit services from their incumbent auditors than non-family firms. The results also show that family firms with ineffective audit committees pay higher non-audit service fees when their family members own shares or hold board positions, indicating that both types of involvement lead to larger non-audit service expenditures.

中文翻译：

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审计委员会的有效性和非审计服务费：来自英国家族企业的证据

摘要 本研究考察了家族企业和非家族企业审计委员会的存在是否会影响企业向现任审计师购买非审计服务。使用 2005 年至 2013 年对英国上市公司的 1736 份观察样本，我们发现无效的审计委员会与非审计服务费之间存在显着的正相关。这种关联对于家族企业比非家族企业更为明显，这表明在英国，与非家族企业相比，审计委员会无效的家族企业倾向于从现任审计师那里购买更多的非审计服务。结果还表明，审计委员会无效的家族企业在其家族成员拥有股份或担任董事会职位时支付更高的非审计服务费用，