Avicenna introduces the primary propositions (or the primaries, for short) as the most fundamental principles of knowledge. (In this paper, we are not primarily concerned with the primary/first intelligibles as concepts/conceptions.) However, as far as we are aware, Avicenna’s primaries have not yet been independently studied. Nor do Avicenna scholars agree on how to characterize them in the language of contemporary philosophy. It is well-known that the primaries are indemonstrable; nonetheless, it is not clear what the genealogy of the primaries is (§2), how, epistemologically speaking, they can be distinguished from other principles (§3), what their phenomenology is (§4), what the cause of the assent to them is (§5), how to explain the relationship between the ‘innate [nature] of the intellect’ and the primaries (§6) and, finally, back to their indemonstrability, in what sense they are ‘indemonstrable’ (§7). We will try to fill this gap. As a corollary, we will explain why Gutas’s view [Gutas, Dimitri. 2012. ‘The empiricism of Avicenna’, Oriens, 40, 391–436], among others, according to which the primaries are analytic (in the Kantian sense) is not true in general (§8). More particularly, we will argue that some primary propositions can be categorized under Kantian synthetic a priori, consistent with Black’s and Ardeshir’s conjecture [Black, Deborah L. 2013. ‘Certitude, justification, and the principles of knowledge in Avicenna’s epistemology’, in Peter Adamson, Interpreting Avicenna: Critical Essays, New York: Cambridge University Press; Ardeshir, Mohammad. 2008. ‘Ibn Sīnā’s philosophy of mathematics’, in S. Rahman, T. Street, and H. Tahiri, The Unity of Science in the Arabic Tradition, New York: Springer]. We hope that this work opens up some space to study Avicenna’s philosophy of mathematics and logic in connection with his epistemology, philosophy of mind and metaphysics.

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阿维森纳的主要提案

阿维森纳将基本命题（或简称为基本命题）作为最基本的知识原则引入。（在本文中，我们不主要关注作为概念/概念的初级/第一可理解物。）然而，据我们所知，阿维森纳的初级还没有被独立研究。阿维森纳的学者们也不同意如何用当代哲学的语言来描述它们。众所周知，初选是无法证明的。尽管如此，尚不清楚初选的谱系是什么（§2），从认识论上讲，它们如何与其他原则区分开来（§3），它们的现象学是什么（§4），同意的原因是什么对他们来说是（§5），如何解释“智力的先天[nature]”和初级（§6）之间的关系，最后，回到它们的不可证明性，在什么意义上它们是“不可证明的”（第 7 节）。我们将努力填补这一空白。作为推论，我们将解释为什么 Gutas 的观点 [Gutas, Dimitri. 2012. 'The empiricism of Avicenna', Oriens, 40, 391–436] 等，其中原色是分析性的（康德意义上的）在一般情况下是不正确的（§8）。更具体地说，我们将论证一些主要命题可以归类在康德综合先验下，与布莱克和阿德希尔的猜想一致 [Black, Deborah L. 2013.'Certitude, justification, and the Principles of Knowledge in Avicenna'sepistemology', in Peter亚当森，《解释阿维森纳：批判性论文》，纽约：剑桥大学出版社；阿德希尔，穆罕默德。2008. “Ibn Sīnā 的数学哲学”，S. Rahman、T. Street 和 H. Tahiri，阿拉伯传统中科学的统一，纽约：斯普林格]。我们希望这项工作为研究阿维森纳的数学和逻辑哲学以及他的认识论、心灵哲学和形而上学开辟了一些空间。