In this paper I argue that Hegel’s treatment of dialectical inferences, in particular of Plato’s dialectics in the Lectures on the History of Philosophy, belongs to the history of the logical rule that, from Gerolamo Cardano to Bertrand Russell, is known as consequentia mirabilis (CM). In 1906 Russell formalises it as follows: and its correspondent positive form as My paper has two parts. First, I show that dialectical inferences, for Hegel, involve sentences of the form and . Hegel, following Plato, stresses that these inferences are das Wunderbare, the marvellous element of dialectical reasoning. In this sense Hegel’s view belongs to the history of CM from a perspective that is both terminological and logical. Second, I stress the peculiarity of Hegel’s CM. In a classical setting, the conditional is admissible and from we can, by CM, derive , and from , by CM, infer . However, in Hegel’s analysis it is evident that we can neither infer from , nor from . Rather, in dialectical inferences what we can validly infer from and is only .

中文翻译：

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黑格尔和奇迹的后果

在本文中，我认为黑格尔对辩证推理的处理，特别是柏拉图在哲学史讲义中的辩证法，属于逻辑规则的历史，从 Gerolamo Cardano 到 Bertrand Russell，被称为 consequentia mirabilis (CM ）。1906 年，罗素将其形式化如下： 其相应的肯定形式作为我的论文有两个部分。首先，我表明，对于黑格尔来说，辩证推理涉及形式为 和 的句子。黑格尔跟随柏拉图，强调这些推论是辩证推理的奇妙要素 das Wunderbare。在这个意义上，从术语和逻辑的角度来看，黑格尔的观点属于 CM 的历史。其次，我强调黑格尔的CM的特殊性。在经典设置中，条件是可以接受的，我们可以通过 CM 推导出 ，并从 CM 推断。然而，在黑格尔的分析中，很明显我们既不能从 推断，也不能从 推断。相反，在辩证推论中，我们可以有效地推论出的只是 。