Learning from the positions and methods of older authors helps cultivating ‘a reflective capacity for discerning things that cannot be discovered by a dogmatic procedure’ (23), so that we can speak of ‘Kant’s critical eclecticism’ (24). And the third aspect of the kaleidoscopic research is her combination of the normally strictly separated leads of historical or systematical research in order to examine the following questions: is logic a distinct branch of philosophy? is it a science, an organon, or both? if it can be proven as a theoretical science and also as a strict one, what is its subject matter in the sense of its differentia specifica and on what principles is it grounded? These questions help in decoding the Kantian way of conceiving of philosophy of logic (199). They perhaps seem to be too old to be of deeper interest. But in order to gain insight into the originality of Kant’s ‘answers to long-disputed questions’ (xiii) it is helpful to know as many former answers as possible. Lu-Adler takes into account older theories of Aristotle, Epicurus, Seneca and other Stoics, Ramus and Zabarella as well as early modern authors like Bacon, Locke, Leibniz, Wolff, Meier, Knutzen and Baumgarten and also direct contemporaries like Maimon. For Kant logic is a science and its subject matter are formal rules of thinking; it has to be used as a canon ‘for the logical assessment of all thoughts’ but is not a universal organon (66). Kant is challenging older authorities and he introduces new elements into the field, especially transcendental logic, while his main target is to make logic and philosophy scientific. According to Christian Wolff every science, like paradigmatically mathematics, has a pure and an applied part. This is integrated into Kant’s theory but he is even more rigorous than Wolff in stressing the role of rules in order to examine logic as a ‘science of reason’ (111). These rules cannot be demonstrated psychologically, so Kant had to refute certain positions of Locke or, for example, Wolff. The dichotomy of pure logic, provable a priori, and applied logic in Kant takes over older distinctions like logica artificialis/naturalis, logica docens/utens, scientia rationalis/realis, but of course, as Lu-Adler is insisting, it is not matching the Wolffian distinction of logica theoretica and practica. Lu-Adler gives a lot of examples of the ways in which Kant is integrating or refuting concepts and theories. By way of combining certain traditional approaches Kant sometimes produces absolutely new divisions. He always gives hints whether he is accepting or refuting other theories or even with regard to several parts is doing both of them. Transcendental logic substitutes, for example, ontological theories in order to gain formal, scientific criteria of judging and conceiving of metaphysical concepts. Kant characterizes both, logic and metaphysics, as ‘pure philosophy founded on a priori principles’ (180). To come to a conclusion: a lot of work of the kind Lu-Adler has done still needs to be done (201) but it can be welcomed as a first step and, so she hopes, it may be an inspiration for further research. I think it absolutely is!

中文翻译：

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必要性丢失。早期分析哲学中的情态与逻辑

学习老作者的立场和方法有助于培养“对无法通过教条程序发现的事物进行辨别的反思能力”（23），因此我们可以说“康德的批判折衷主义”（24）。万花筒研究的第三个方面是她结合了通常严格分开的历史或系统研究的线索，以检验以下问题：逻辑是哲学的一个独特分支吗？它是一门科学，一种器官，还是两者兼而有之？如果它既可以被证明是一门理论科学，又可以被证明是一门严格的科学，那么它的具体主题是什么，它基于什么原则？这些问题有助于解读康德式的逻辑哲学构想方式（199）。他们可能看起来太老了，无法产生更深的兴趣。但是为了深入了解康德“对长期争论不休的问题的回答”（xiii）的独创性，尽可能多地了解以前的回答是有帮助的。Lu-Adler 考虑了亚里士多德、伊壁鸠鲁、塞内卡和其他斯多葛学派、拉穆斯和扎巴雷拉的旧理论，以及培根、洛克、莱布尼茨、沃尔夫、迈耶、克努岑和鲍姆加滕等早期现代作家以及迈蒙等直接同时代人的理论。因为康德逻辑是一门科学，它的主题是思维的形式规则；它必须用作“对所有思想进行逻辑评估”的经典，但它不是通用的器官（66）。康德正在挑战旧的权威，他在这个领域引入了新的元素，特别是先验逻辑，而他的主要目标是使逻辑和哲学变得科学。根据克里斯蒂安沃尔夫的每门科学，像范式数学一样，有纯部分和应用部分。这被整合到康德的理论中，但他比沃尔夫更严格地强调规则的作用，以便将逻辑视为“理性科学”（111）。这些规则无法在心理上得到证明，因此康德不得不驳斥洛克或沃尔夫的某些立场。康德中的纯逻辑、先验可证明和应用逻辑的二分法取代了旧的区分，如人工逻辑/自然逻辑、文档逻辑/用具、理性科学/实在论，但当然，正如 Lu-Adler 所坚持的那样，它并不匹配逻辑学理论和实践的沃尔夫区分。Lu-Adler 举例说明了康德整合或驳斥概念和理论的方式。通过结合某些传统方法，康德有时会产生绝对新的划分。他总是暗示他是在接受还是在反驳其他理论，甚至就几个部分来说是两者兼而有之。例如，先验逻辑取代本体论理论，以获得对形而上学概念进行判断和构想的正式、科学的标准。康德将逻辑学和形而上学都描述为“建立在先验原则之上的纯粹哲学”（180）。得出一个结论：Lu-Adler 所做的很多工作仍然需要完成（201），但它可以作为第一步而受到欢迎，因此她希望它可以成为进一步研究的灵感。我认为绝对是！他总是暗示他是在接受还是在反驳其他理论，甚至就几个部分来说是两者兼而有之。例如，先验逻辑代替本体论理论，以获得判断和构思形而上学概念的正式、科学的标准。康德将逻辑学和形而上学都描述为“建立在先验原则之上的纯粹哲学”（180）。得出一个结论：Lu-Adler 所做的很多工作仍然需要完成（201），但它可以作为第一步而受到欢迎，因此她希望它可以成为进一步研究的灵感。我认为绝对是！他总是暗示他是在接受还是在反驳其他理论，甚至就几个部分来说是两者兼而有之。例如，先验逻辑取代本体论理论，以获得对形而上学概念进行判断和构想的正式、科学的标准。康德将逻辑学和形而上学都描述为“建立在先验原则之上的纯粹哲学”（180）。得出一个结论：Lu-Adler 所做的很多工作仍然需要完成（201），但它可以作为第一步而受到欢迎，因此她希望它可以成为进一步研究的灵感。我认为绝对是！逻辑和形而上学，作为“建立在先验原则之上的纯粹哲学”（180）。得出一个结论：Lu-Adler 所做的很多工作仍然需要完成（201），但它可以作为第一步而受到欢迎，因此她希望它可以成为进一步研究的灵感。我认为绝对是！逻辑和形而上学，作为“建立在先验原则之上的纯粹哲学”（180）。得出一个结论：Lu-Adler 所做的很多工作仍然需要完成（201），但它可以作为第一步而受到欢迎，因此她希望它可以成为进一步研究的灵感。我认为绝对是！