Sellars [1960. ‘Grammar and existence: A preface to ontology’, Mind, 69 (276), 499–533; 1979. Naturalism and Ontology, Reseda, CA: Ridgeview Publishing Company] argues that the truth of a second-order sentence, e.g. , does not incur commitment to there being any sort of abstract entity. This paper begins by exploring the arguments that Sellars offers for the above claim. It then develops those arguments by pointing out places where Sellars has been unclear or ought to have said more. In particular, Sellars's arguments rely on there being a means by which language users could come to understand sentences of a second-order language wherein the truth of sentences of the form do not require there to be abstract entities. In addition to this, as Sellars [1979. Naturalism and Ontology, Reseda, CA: Ridgeview Publishing Company] notes, a formal account of quantification is required that does not make use of the apparatus of sequences. Both a translation of and a formal account of quantification are provided by this paper.

中文翻译：

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Sellars、二阶量化和本体论承诺

塞拉斯 [1960. “语法与存在：本体论的序言”，Mind，69（276），499-533；1979. Naturalism and Ontology, Reseda, CA: Ridgeview Publishing Company] 认为二阶句子的真实性，例如，不会导致对存在任何抽象实体的承诺。本文首先探讨了 Sellars 为上述主张提供的论点。然后它通过指出塞拉斯不清楚或应该多说的地方来发展这些论点。特别是，Sellars 的论点依赖于语言用户可以通过一种手段来理解二阶语言的句子，其中这种形式的句子的真实性不需要存在抽象实体。除此之外，如 Sellars [1979. 自然主义和本体论，Reseda，CA：Ridgeview Publishing Company] 注释，需要不使用序列装置的量化的正式说明。本文提供了量化的翻译和正式说明。