Small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) faces much more severe financial constraints compared to large mature companies and it is more vulnerable to market imperfection. To alleviate SMEs’ financial constraints, Public Credit Guarantee Schemes (CGSs) have been introduced and widely used around the world. Having provided a thorough analysis of the effectiveness of the traditional CGSs, we introduce an innovative financing contract, referred to as equity-for-guarantee swap (EGS), with the aim of reducing SMEs’ financial constraints in a more effective way. We show that EGS effectively alleviates SMEs’ severe financial constraints as it transfers the information asymmetry between lenders and SMEs to that between insurers and SMEs We investigate how asset prices vary across time under the EGS contract and analyze insurers’ risk exposure, i.e. value-at-risk (VaR) and expected shortfall (ES), of participating in the EGS contract. Consistent with pecking order theory, SMEs tend to use debt financing first dispite the benefit of a boosted growth rate from private equity financing in our model.

与成熟的大型企业相比，中小型企业 (SME) 面临更严重的财务约束，更容易受到市场不完善的影响。为缓解中小企业的财务限制，公共信用担保计划（CGS）已被引入并在世界范围内广泛使用。在对传统 CGS 的有效性进行了全面分析后，我们引入了一种创新的融资合同，称为股权换担保互换 (EGS)，旨在以更有效的方式减少中小企业的财务约束。我们表明 EGS 有效地缓解了中小企业的严重财务约束，因为它将贷款人和中小企业之间的信息不对称转移到了保险公司和中小企业之间 我们调查了 EGS 合同下资产价格如何随时间变化并分析了保险公司的风险敞口，即 参与 EGS 合约的风险价值 (VaR) 和预期差额 (ES)。与啄食顺序理论一致，尽管我们的模型中私募股权融资提高了增长率，但中小企业倾向于首先使用债务融资。