This research introduces endogenous codetermination in a Cournot duopoly. Unlike the received literature (Kraft, 1998), this work assumes that firms bargain with their own union bargaining units under codetermination if and only if they can choose an ad hoc bargaining effort by maximising profits (three-stage non-cooperative game). There are remarkable differences compared with the main findings of the exogenous codetermination literature. Indeed, there may exist asymmetric multiple (Pareto efficient) Nash equilibria in pure strategies. Mandatory codetermination, therefore, is Pareto worsening. Each firm can then use the union bargaining power as a strategic device in a Cournot setting.

中文翻译：

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内源性共同测定

这项研究在古诺双头垄断中引入了内源性共同决定。与收到的文献（Kraft，1998）不同，这项工作假设公司在共同决定下与自己的工会谈判单位进行谈判，当且仅当他们可以通过最大化利润（三阶段非合作博弈）来选择临时谈判努力。与外源共决定文献的主要发现相比，存在显着差异。事实上，纯策略中可能存在不对称的多重（帕累托有效）纳什均衡。因此，强制性的共同决定是帕累托恶化。然后，每个公司都可以将工会的议价能力用作古诺环境中的一种战略手段。