I examine the relation between firms’ financial conduct and wage theft. Wage theft represents the single largest form of theft committed in the United States and primarily affects firms’ most vulnerable employees. I show that wage theft is more prevalent (i) when firms just meet or beat earnings targets and (ii) when executives’ personal liability for wage theft decreases. Wage theft precedes financial misconduct while the theft is undetected, but once firms are caught engaging in wage theft they are more likely to shift to engaging in financial misconduct. My findings highlight an economically meaningful yet previously undocumented way in which firms’ financial incentives relate to employee treatment.

我研究了公司的财务行为与工资盗窃之间的关系。工资盗窃是美国最大的单一盗窃形式，主要影响公司最脆弱的员工。我表明，当公司刚刚达到或超过盈利目标时，以及（ii）当高管对工资盗窃的个人责任减少时，工资盗窃更为普遍。工资盗窃先于财务不当行为，而盗窃未被发现，但一旦公司被发现从事工资盗窃，他们更有可能转向从事财务不当行为。我的发现强调了一种在经济上有意义但以前没有记录的方式，即公司的财务激励与员工待遇相关。