Electric power sectors around the world have changed dramatically in the last 25 years as a result of sector liberalization policies. Many electricity sectors are now pursuing deep decarbonization goals which will entail replacing dispatchable fossil generation primarily with intermittent renewable generation (wind and solar) over the next 20–30 years. This transition creates new challenges for both short-term wholesale market design and investment incentives consistent with achieving both decarbonization commitments and security of supply criteria. Thinking broadly about the options for institutional change from a Williamsonian perspective – thinking like Williamson – provides a useful framework for examining institutional adaptation. Hybrid markets that combine ‘competition for the market’ that relies on competitive procurement for long-term purchased power agreements with wind, solar, and storage developers, ideally in a technology neutral fashion, and ‘competition in the market’ that relies on short-term markets designed to produce efficient and reliable operations of intermittent generation and storage, is identified as a promising direction for institutional adaptation. Many auction, contract, and market integration issues remain to be resolved.

在过去的 25 年里，由于行业自由化政策，世界各地的电力行业发生了巨大变化。许多电力部门现在都在追求深度脱碳目标，这将需要在未来 20-30 年内主要用间歇性可再生能源发电（风能和太阳能）取代可调度的化石发电。这种转变为短期批发市场设计和投资激励措施带来了新的挑战，这些挑战与实现脱碳承诺和供应安全标准相一致。从威廉姆森的角度广泛思考制度变革的选择——像威廉姆森一样思考——为检查制度适应提供了一个有用的框架。混合市场结合了“市场竞争”和“市场竞争”，后者依赖于与风能、太阳能和储能开发商的长期购买电力协议的竞争性采购，理想情况下是技术中立的方式，以及依赖于短期电力的“市场竞争”。旨在产生间歇性发电和储存的高效和可靠运行的期限市场被确定为机构适应的有希望的方向。许多拍卖、合同和市场整合问题仍有待解决。