Purpose

This study aims to explore the effects of director liability reduction (DLR) laws on corporate innovation strategies in South Korea.

Design/methodology/approach

Regression analysis is used to investigate the effects of the directors' liability reduction coverage on the corporate innovation. The data includes 7,517 firm-year observations spanning from 2011 to 2017.

Findings

The authors provide empirical evidence that directors feel protected by the coverage and are able to focus more on innovative projects. Using research and development expenditure and the number of patents registered to measure the firm's innovation, we find that covered firms spend more on R&D and register more patents than non-covered firms.

Originality/value

This study extends the literature on corporate innovation. A vast amount of literature empirically tests how best to motivate directors to engage in innovative activities. On the same line, this study is the first to empirically test the effect of DLR shelters on directors' motivations toward innovation.

中文翻译：

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董事减责能否促进企业创新？

目的

本研究旨在探讨减少董事责任 (DLR) 法律对韩国企业创新战略的影响。

设计/方法/方法

回归分析用于考察董事责任减免覆盖对企业创新的影响。数据包括从 2011 年到 2017 年的 7,517 个公司年度观察结果。

发现

作者提供的经验证据表明，董事们感到受到了覆盖范围的保护，并且能够更多地关注创新项目。使用研发支出和注册专利数量来衡量公司的创新，我们发现覆盖的公司比未覆盖的公司在研发上花费更多，注册的专利更多。

原创性/价值

本研究扩展了有关企业创新的文献。大量文献实证检验了如何最好地激励董事参与创新活动。同样，本研究首次对 DLR 庇护所对董事创新动机的影响进行了实证检验。