Abstract

Chalmers has argued that Bayesianism supports the existence of a priori truths, since it entails that scrutability conditionals are not rationally revisable. However, as we argue, Chalmers s arguments leave open that every proposition is rationally deniable, which would be devastating for large parts of his philosophical program. We suggest that Chalmers should appeal to well-known convergence theorems to argue that ideally rational subjects converge on the truth of scrutability conditionals. However, our discussion reveals that showing that these theorems apply in effect requires assuming scrutability. Consequently, Bayesianism doesn t conflict with Chalmers s scrutability framework, but it doesn t support it, either.

中文翻译：

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可审查性条件是否可以合理否定？

摘要

查默斯认为，贝叶斯主义支持先验真理的存在，因为它意味着可审查性条件在理性上是不可修正的。然而，正如我们所争论的那样，查默斯的论点使每个命题都可以合理地否定，这对他的大部分哲学计划来说将是毁灭性的。我们建议 Chalmers 应该求助于众所周知的收敛定理来论证理想理性的主题收敛于可审查性条件的真相。然而，我们的讨论表明，要证明这些定理实际上适用，需要假设可审查性。因此，贝叶斯主义与查默斯的可审查性框架并不冲突，但它也不支持它。