Abstract

I show that some famous arguments against moral responsibility — most notably, Galen Strawson’s Basic Argument and Susan Wolf’s Troubling Train of Thought — reason in an unnatural way: if a clearly has some property that results in our saying that a is F, and if b less clearly has that property, then it is the case that b is F. I argue that this problem is not present in reasons-responsiveness theories of responsibility. I do so by applying Boolos’s elegant technique of generating spanning conditionals from universal instantiations of mathematical induction premises.

中文翻译：

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不负责任地沿着滑坡向下缩放

摘要

我展示了一些反对道德责任的著名论点——最著名的是盖伦·斯特劳森的基本论点和苏珊·沃尔夫的令人不安的思路——以一种不自然的方式进行推理：如果 a 明显具有某些属性，导致我们说 a 是 F，并且如果 b不太清楚地具有该属性，那么 b 是 F 的情况。我认为这个问题不存在于责任的原因 - 响应性理论中。我通过应用 Boolos 从数学归纳前提的通用实例化生成跨越条件的优雅技术来做到这一点。