The Popular Mobilisation Units’ (PMU) rise in Iraq resulted from a de facto, post-2003 hybridization of security governance, opposed to an emergency measure to combat Islamic State after 2014. Rather than a cohesive sectarian movement, the PMU moniker granted a government veneer to an array of pre-existing or new militias, representing a decentralized Shi’a Arab mobilisation prior to 2014, symptomatic of Iraq’s divisive patronage politics. Perceived by the US and the Arab world as ‘pro-Iranian Shi’a militias’, as a spoiler to Iraq’s sovereignty, and an Iranian means of securing its control over Baghdad, while some militias began as NSAAs, the PMU have evolved into quasi-state actors by becoming part of the state, but not under its complete control. Ultimately, their power within Iraq is constrained by the other political institutions, such as the electoral cycle, the Shi’a clerical establishment, and a protest movement, in addition to a pandemic, Covid-19.

伊拉克人民动员组织 (PMU) 的崛起源于 2003 年后事实上的安全治理混合，反对 2014 年后打击伊斯兰国的紧急措施。 PMU 的绰号不是凝聚力的宗派运动，而是授予政府伪装成一系列现有的或新的民兵，代表了 2014 年之前分散的什叶派阿拉伯动员，是伊拉克分裂赞助政治的征兆。被美国和阿拉伯世界视为“亲伊朗什叶派民兵”，是伊拉克主权的破坏者，是伊朗确保其控制巴格达的手段，而一些民兵最初是作为 NSAAs，PMU 已经演变成准- 国家行为者成为国家的一部分，但不受其完全控制。最终，他们在伊拉克的权力受到其他政治机构的限制，