This study investigates the interplay between manufacturer encroachment and the manufacturer’s equal pricig strategy. Encroachment happens when a manufacturer opens up a direct channel to compete with a retailer’s traditional channel. The equal pricing strategy is that the manufacturer commits to setting a direct channel retail price that equals the price determined by the retailer in the traditional channel. We first consider the setting where one exclusive retailer sells products from a manufacturer that does not have the option of selling only through its direct channel. Our results show that the availability of the equal pricing commitment enhances the manufacturer’s incentive to encroach when the channel competition is intense and the encroachment cost is medium. Interestingly, the manufacturer’s equal pricing commitment always hurts the retailer even though it eliminates the price competition between the two channels. This is because the availability of the equal pricing commitment could motivate the manufacturer’s encroachment. Our analysis shows that the manufacturer’s equal pricing commitment always improves consumer surplus and sometimes improves the supply chain performance. However, when the retailer also sells a substitutable product from a different manufacturer or the manufacturer has the option of only direct selling, the equal pricing commitment sometimes benefits the retailer and sometimes reduces the consumer surplus.

本研究调查了制造商侵占与制造商等价策略之间的相互作用。当制造商开辟直接渠道与零售商的传统渠道竞争时，就会发生侵占。均等定价策略是制造商承诺设定与零售商在传统渠道中确定的价格相等的直接渠道零售价。我们首先考虑这样一种情况：一家独家零售商销售来自制造商的产品，而该制造商不能选择仅通过其直接渠道进行销售。我们的结果表明，当渠道竞争激烈且侵占成本中等时，等价承诺的可用性增强了制造商侵占的动机。有趣的是，制造商的等价承诺即使消除了两个渠道之间的价格竞争，也总是损害零售商的利益。这是因为平等定价承诺的可用性可能会激发制造商的侵占。我们的分析表明，制造商的等价承诺总是会提高消费者剩余，有时也会提高供应链绩效。然而，当零售商也销售来自不同制造商的可替代产品或制造商只能选择直销时，等价承诺有时会使零售商受益，有时会减少消费者剩余。我们的分析表明，制造商的等价承诺总是会提高消费者剩余，有时也会提高供应链绩效。然而，当零售商也销售来自不同制造商的可替代产品或制造商只能选择直销时，等价承诺有时会使零售商受益，有时会减少消费者剩余。我们的分析表明，制造商的等价承诺总是会提高消费者剩余，有时也会提高供应链绩效。然而，当零售商也销售来自不同制造商的可替代产品或制造商只能选择直销时，等价承诺有时会使零售商受益，有时会减少消费者剩余。