We study the impact of rank-based decision-making in a multi-member plurality electoral system by examining the decisions of Philippine legislative councilors to run for and win higher office. By focusing on multi-member plurality elections, we identify the effect of rank amongst politicians that hold the same office and received a similar number of votes. To identify the causal effect of rank, we conduct a close-elections RD at the village, municipality, and province levels. Our main result is the first place effect: incumbent first placers are 5–9% (1–4%) more likely to run (win) in future elections than incumbent second placers. The first place effect is unique among rank effects: subsequent rank comparisons yield substantially weaker or insignificant results. Further evidence suggests that a variety of potential mechanisms—party alignment, strategic voting, differential levels of media exposure or the better performance of first placers—do not seem to explain our results. These results improve our understanding of the variety of ways rank effects interact with electoral systems.

我们通过检查菲律宾立法委员竞选和赢得更高职位的决定来研究基于等级的决策在多成员多数选举制度中的影响。通过关注多成员多数制选举，我们确定了担任同一职位并获得相似票数的政治家之间的等级影响。为了确定等级的因果效应，我们在村、市和省各级进行了近距离选举 RD。我们的主要结果是首位效应：现任一等奖者在未来选举中参选（获胜）的可能性比现任二等奖者高 5-9% (1-4%)。第一位效应在排名效应中是独一无二的：随后的排名比较产生明显较弱或不显着的结果。进一步的证据表明，各种潜在的机制——政党联盟、战略投票、不同的媒体曝光水平或第一名的更好表现——似乎无法解释我们的结果。这些结果提高了我们对排名效应与选举系统相互作用的各种方式的理解。