Uncertainty around fiscal policy has the potential to alter the lending behavior, investment, and employment of bank holding companies, all of which affect a bank's bottom line. Management forecasts of loan losses exhibit greater dispersion during these periods. However, this uncertainty provides management greater flexibility in estimating loan loss provisions to achieve firm objectives. Using a sample of 2483 U.S. bank holding companies, we demonstrate that the positive relationship between economic policy uncertainty and discretionary loan loss provisions is contingent on BHC characteristics and stakeholder oversight. The presence of institutional investors, increased analyst following, and dividend issuance attenuates the positive relationship between policy uncertainty and discretionary loan loss provisions. We also find that increased regulatory scrutiny weakens this relationship. Our findings indicate policy uncertainty provides cover to managements' inaccurate adjustments of loan loss provisions, but management is less willing to make such adjustments when internal and external stakeholders are informed.

财政政策的不确定性有可能改变银行控股公司的贷款行为、投资和就业，所有这些都会影响银行的底线。在这些时期，管理层对贷款损失的预测表现出更大的分散性。然而，这种不确定性为管理层估计贷款损失准备金以实现公司目标提供了更大的灵活性。我们使用 2483 家美国银行控股公司的样本，证明了经济政策不确定性与可自由支配的贷款损失准备金之间的正相关关系取决于 BHC 的特征和利益相关者的监督。机构投资者的存在、分析师关注的增加以及股息的发行减弱了政策不确定性与可自由支配的贷款损失准备金之间的正相关关系。我们还发现，加强监管审查削弱了这种关系。我们的研究结果表明，政策不确定性为管理层对贷款损失准备金的不准确调整提供了掩护，但当内部和外部利益相关者获悉时，管理层不太愿意进行此类调整。