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Supplier’s cooperation strategy with two competing manufacturers under wholesale price discount contract considering technology investment
Soft Computing ( IF 3.1 ) Pub Date : 2021-06-12 , DOI: 10.1007/s00500-021-05904-0
Shanxue Yang , Hongwei Liu , Guoli Wang , Yifei Hao

Cooperation between upstream suppliers and downstream manufacturers in technology investment is a popular way to improve production technology for reducing suppliers’ production costs of key components. The suppliers’ cooperation strategies are mainly influenced by manufacturers’ technology investments and wholesale price discount contracts provided by suppliers. This paper explores whether a supplier should cooperate with two downstream competing manufacturers to accept their technology investments to reduce the supplier’s production cost of a key component. Specifically, we consider the following three cooperation strategies: The supplier does not accept manufacturers’ technology investments, only accepts one manufacturer’s technology investment and accepts both manufacturers’ technology investments. Our results demonstrate that the wholesale price discount contract and the technology investment can enhance the profits of the supplier and two manufacturers when the discount degree is low. Further, we conclude that when the discount degree is relatively low or when both the discount degree and the technology investment efficiency are relatively high, the supplier’s optimal cooperation strategy with two manufacturers is to accept both manufacturers’ technology investments and both manufacturers are also willing to invest simultaneously. At last, we extend the model to the asymmetric potential market size and show that our theoretical results are robust.



中文翻译:

考虑技术投资的批发价格折扣合同下供应商与两个竞争制造商的合作策略

上游供应商与下游制造商在技术投资方面的合作是提高生产技术以降低供应商关键零部件生产成本的流行方式。供应商的合作策略主要受制造商的技术投资和供应商提供的批发价格折扣合同的影响。本文探讨供应商是否应与两个下游竞争制造商合作,接受他们的技术投资,以降低供应商的关键零部件生产成本。具体来说,我们考虑以下三种合作策略:供应商不接受制造商的技术投资,只接受一个制造商的技术投资,接受双方制造商的技术投资。我们的研究结果表明,批发价格折扣合同和技术投资可以在折扣程度较低时提高供应商和两个制造商的利润。进一步,我们得出结论,当折扣度较低或折扣度和技术投资效率都较高时,供应商与两家制造商的最佳合作策略是接受双方制造商的技术投资,并且双方制造商也愿意同时投资。最后,我们将模型扩展到不对称的潜在市场规模,并表明我们的理论结果是稳健的。我们得出结论,当折扣度较低或折扣度和技术投资效率都较高时,供应商与两个制造商的最佳合作策略是接受两个制造商的技术投资,并且两个制造商也愿意同时投资. 最后,我们将模型扩展到不对称的潜在市场规模,并表明我们的理论结果是稳健的。我们得出结论,当折扣度较低或折扣度和技术投资效率都较高时,供应商与两个制造商的最佳合作策略是接受两个制造商的技术投资,并且两个制造商也愿意同时投资. 最后,我们将模型扩展到不对称的潜在市场规模,并表明我们的理论结果是稳健的。

更新日期:2021-06-13
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