ABSTRACT

Interface theory is the hypothesis that inferential, representational theories of perception entail that fitness, not truth, dictates the evolution of perceptual systems. They show, with simulations, that “veridical” perceptual mappings (ones that preserve at least some of the structure of the world) are routinely out-competed by “non-veridical” interfaces (ones that make no attempt to preserve that structure). They therefore take particular aim at the direct perception, ecological approach to perception and work to show that such a system, even if technically an option, would never be selected for by evolution. This paper defends the ecological approach from this novel, existential attack by showing that the ecological hypothesis is so different in kind to the inferential, representational view of perception that it simply falls outside the scope of interface theory’s critiques; ecological psychology remains a viable scientific endeavor. This analysis will show that, far from being a radical new approach to perception, interface theory is simply a clear and elegant formalization of mainstream representational psychology, and any implications interface theory may have belong solely to that branch of science.

摘要

界面理论是这样一种假设，即推理的、表征的感知理论需要适应度，而不是真理，决定了感知系统的进化。他们通过模拟表明，“真实”感知映射（至少保留部分世界结构的映射）通常会被“非真实”界面（不尝试保留该结构的界面）所击败。因此，他们特别针对直接感知、感知的生态方法，并努力表明这样的系统，即使在技术上是一个选项，也永远不会被进化选择。本文通过展示生态假设与推论在种类上如此不同，为这种新颖的存在主义攻击辩护了生态学方法，感知的代表性观点认为它完全超出了界面理论的批评范围；生态心理学仍然是一项可行的科学努力。这种分析将表明，界面理论远不是一种全新的感知方法，而是一种清晰而优雅的主流表征心理学形式化，界面理论的任何含义可能只属于该科学分支。