This article deals with an argument reported by Razi (d. 1210) that attempted to undermine the immaterialist position about human nature. After some introductory remarks and explanation of the conceptual background, the article analyses the structure of the argument, with special attention to the idea of soul-switching.’ Some comparisons are made between the argument reported by Razi and a number of arguments from modern and contemporary eras of philosophy. One section is devoted to the critique of the argument and its conceptual basis. This article shows that the argument reported by Razi is a methodological antecedent of a family of contemporary epistemological arguments against substance dualism. It is also shown that discussion of the argument could be useful to highlight a weakness in some, but not all, versions of immaterialism about human nature.

中文翻译：

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灵魂转换与人性的非物质性：关于拉齐报道的一个论点

本文涉及 Razi (d. 1210) 报道的一个论点，该论点试图破坏关于人性的非物质主义立场。在对概念背景进行一些介绍性评论和解释之后，文章分析了论证的结构，特别关注灵魂转换的思想.' 将 Razi 报告的论点与现代和当代哲学时代的许多论点进行了一些比较。一节专门讨论对论证及其概念基础的批判。这篇文章表明，拉齐报道的论点是当代反对实体二元论的认识论论点的方法论先例。还表明，对论证的讨论可能有助于突出某些（但不是全部）关于人性的非物质主义版本的弱点。