We reexamine the role of incomplete contracts in a dynamic model of renegotiation that endogenizes the timing of investments and trade. The interaction between bargaining and investment significantly alters the lessons learned from static models. When the opportunity to trade is expected to be long lasting, contracts that exacerbate the parties’ absolute vulnerability to hold-up—especially following under-investment—are desirable. For example, joint ownership of complementary assets can be optimal, an exclusivity agreement can protect the investments of its recipient, and trade contracts can facilitate purely cooperative investment.

中文翻译：

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交易，还是不交易，这是一个问题：动态设置中不完全合约的新角色

我们重新审视不完全合同在重新谈判的动态模型中的作用，该模型使投资和贸易的时机内生化。讨价还价和投资之间的相互作用极大地改变了从静态模型中吸取的经验教训。当交易机会预计会持续很长时间时，会加剧双方对拖延的绝对脆弱性（尤其是在投资不足之后）的合同是可取的。例如，互补资产的共同所有权可以是最优的，排他性协议可以保护其接受者的投资，贸易合同可以促进纯粹的合作投资。