Abstract

After a period of dormancy, the topic of interim measures (IMs) in antitrust investigations has been brought back into the spotlight in the context of fast-moving digital markets. We analyze historical practices and criteria surrounding IMs in the United States and Europe. Then we present an economic model of the parameters underlying IMs, which can inform the decision of whether to pursue them. The two key parameters needed to determine the benefits of taking an IM are the relative magnitudes of irreparable harm to each party and the probability that the conduct is found to be anticompetitive. A resulting insight is that the overall size of the irreparable harms is not as relevant as their relative size (that is, asymmetry). Increasing both types of harm in the same proportion would not change the decision to use an IM. However, an increase in the overall size of irreparable harms increases the expected benefit from IMs as a tool, if they are used optimally. Finally, we examine the characteristics of the digital economy, finding that while such characteristics are likely to increase the benefits of IMs as a general tool, there is a need to carefully assess IM decisions on a case-by-case basis.

中文翻译：

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反垄断调查暂行办法：经济讨论

摘要

经过一段时间的休眠，在快速发展的数字市场背景下，反垄断调查中的临时措施 (IM) 话题重新成为人们关注的焦点。我们分析了围绕美国和欧洲 IM 的历史实践和标准。然后，我们提出了 IM 基础参数的经济模型，它可以为是否追求它们的决定提供信息。确定采取 IM 的好处所需的两个关键参数是对每一方造成的不可弥补损害的相对程度以及该行为被认定为反竞争的可能性。由此产生的见解是，无法弥补的损害的总体规模与其相对规模（即不对称性）相关。以相同的比例增加两种类型的伤害不会改变使用 IM 的决定。然而，如果以最佳方式使用 IM，则无法弥补的损害总体规模的增加会增加 IM 作为工具的预期收益。最后，我们检查了数字经济的特征，发现虽然这些特征可能会增加 IM 作为通用工具的好处，但需要根据具体情况仔细评估 IM 决策。