In this paper, we introduce a game that allows one to assess the potential loss of efficiency induced by a decentralized control or local management of a global epidemic. Each player typically represents a region or a country which is assumed to choose its control action to implement a tradeoff between socioeconomic aspects and the health aspect. We conduct the Nash equilibrium analysis of this game. Since the analysis is not trivial in general, sufficient conditions for existence and uniqueness are provided. Then we quantify through numerical results the loss induced by decentralization, measured in terms of price of anarchy (PoA) and price of connectedness (PoC). These results allow one to clearly identify scenarios where decentralization is acceptable or not regarding to the retained global efficiency measures.

中文翻译：

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关于分散式流行病管理和适用于 Covid-19 的效率

在本文中，我们介绍了一种游戏，它允许人们评估全球流行​​病的分散控制或本地管理引起的潜在效率损失。每个参与者通常代表一个地区或一个国家，该地区或国家被假定选择其控制行动以实现社会经济方面和健康方面之间的权衡。我们对该博弈进行纳什均衡分析。由于分析一般不是微不足道的，因此提供了存在唯一性的充分条件。然后我们通过数值结果量化由去中心化引起的损失，以无政府状态的价格 (PoA) 和连通性的价格 (PoC) 衡量。这些结果使人们能够清楚地确定在保留的全球效率措施方面可以接受或不可以接受权力下放的情景。