Luck egalitarians contend that, while each person starts out with a claim to an equal quantity of advantage, she can forfeit this claim by making certain choices. The appeal of luck egalitarianism is that it seems to satisfy what this paper calls the moral tyranny constraint. According to this constraint, any acceptable theory of justice must preclude the possibility of an agent unilaterally, discretionarily, and foreseeably leaving others with less advantage under conditions of full compliance with the theory. This paper argues that claim forfeiture is built into luck egalitarianism specifically to preclude such moral tyranny. However, it contends that the dominant interpretation of luck egalitarianism fails to fully satisfy the moral tyranny constraint. It offers an alternative interpretation that both eliminates the possibility of moral tyranny and rescues the position from two other prominent objections that have been directed against luck egalitarianism.

幸运平等主义者认为，虽然每个人一开始都要求获得同等数量的优势，但她可以通过做出某些选择来放弃这种要求。运气均等主义的吸引力在于它似乎满足了本文所称的道德暴政约束。根据这一约束，任何可接受的正义理论都必须排除代理人在完全遵守该理论的情况下单方面、随意地和可预见地让他人失去优势的可能性。本文认为，索赔没收被纳入运气均等主义，专门用于排除这种道德暴政。然而，它认为运气均等主义的主导解释未能完全满足道德暴政的约束。