Abstract Trade credits provide financing to buyers who might not, otherwise, be able to operate a business. However, sellers may use trade credits to exploit market power and this introduces a market failure that reduces efficiency and social welfare when compared to a competitive market. The objective of this study is to investigate the costs of trade credits for fish feed to fish farmers in Bangladesh and shed light on the power relation as perceived by the farmers and feed sellers. The sources of power are determined by factor analysis. A one-way analysis of variance is used to identify the most powerful party. The results indicate that trade credits were more expensive than cash payments and even bank loans for farmers. The excess costs of trade credits indicate that feed sellers exploit their power and the identification of feed sellers as the powerful party supports this indication. Trade credits, therefore, provide gains in financing fish production that may not otherwise take place, but their costs decrease efficiency. Policymakers can increase efficiency by implementing corrective measures such as ceilings on the costs of trade credits; however, the remuneration of risk must be allowed for trade credits to prevail.

中文翻译：

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贸易信贷是收益还是消耗？向孟加拉国的鲶鱼和罗非鱼养殖户出售饲料的权力

摘要 贸易信贷为可能无法经营业务的买家提供融资。然而，卖方可能会使用贸易信贷来利用市场力量，这会导致市场失灵，与竞争市场相比，会降低效率和社会福利。本研究的目的是调查孟加拉国养鱼户的鱼饲料贸易信贷成本，并阐明养殖户和饲料销售商所感知的权力关系。权力来源由因子分析确定。方差的单向分析用于确定最强大的一方。结果表明，贸易信贷比现金支付甚至农民的银行贷款都贵。贸易信用的超额成本表明，饲料销售商利用了他们的权力，而饲料销售商作为强者的身份支持这一迹象。因此，贸易信贷为鱼类生产融资提供了收益，否则可能不会发生，但其成本会降低效率。政策制定者可以通过实施诸如贸易信贷成本上限等纠正措施来提高效率；然而，风险报酬必须允许贸易信贷占上风。