ABSTRACT On 16 September 2016, the Swaziland High Court delivered judgment in the matter between Maseko and Others v Prime Minister of Swaziland and Others [2016] SZHC 180, in which it declared certain provisions of the Suppression of Terrorism Act (2008); and the Sedition and Subversive Activities Act (1938) as unconstitutional. The Declaration followed a constitutional challenge, based on the applicants’ freedom of expression, assembly and association. The judgment was unprecedented in the Swaziland context, given that of the four applicants, three were political activists and one was a Human Rights lawyer. All four have been in frequent collision with the government over their political opinions. Two judges ruled in favour of the applicants, whilst the third one ruled against them. The judgment was a sharp departure from past decisions, where the courts often ruled in favour of the state, leaving many litigants without a remedy. The ruling marked the first time a Swazi court had declared the Swaziland Constitution a living document. However commendable the main judgment, the dissenting opinion raises several constitutional questions that need to be addressed. This article therefore, critically analyses the dissenting opinion of Justice Hlophe, and seeks to demonstrate that his approach is antithetical to constitutionalism, and is irreconcilable with accepted notions of Bill of Rights litigation.

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关于不确定的术语、恐怖主义和软弱的司法：分析 Maseko 诉斯威士兰总理和其他人案（2016 年）中的不同意见

摘要 2016 年 9 月 16 日，斯威士兰高等法院就 Maseko 等人诉斯威士兰总理等人 [2016] SZHC 180 案作出判决，其中宣布了《制止恐怖主义法》（2008 年）的某些条款；以及《煽动和颠覆活动法》（1938 年）违宪。该宣言遵循宪法挑战，基于申请人的言论、集会和结社自由。鉴于四名申请人中，三名是政治活动家，一名是人权律师，这一判决在斯威士兰的情况下是前所未有的。这四人都经常因政治观点与政府发生冲突。两名法官作出了有利于申请人的裁决，而第三名法官作出了不利于他们的裁决。该判断与过去的决定大相径庭，法院经常作出有利于国家的裁决，使许多诉讼当事人无法获得补救。该裁决标志着斯威士兰法院首次宣布斯威士兰宪法为现行文件。无论主要判决值得称赞，反对意见提出了几个需要解决的宪法问题。因此，本文批判性地分析了 Hlophe 大法官的反对意见，并试图证明他的方法与宪政主义背道而驰，与公认的权利法案诉讼观念不相容。反对意见提出了几个需要解决的宪法问题。因此，本文批判性地分析了 Hlophe 大法官的反对意见，并试图证明他的方法与宪政主义背道而驰，与公认的权利法案诉讼观念不相容。反对意见提出了几个需要解决的宪法问题。因此，本文批判性地分析了 Hlophe 大法官的反对意见，并试图证明他的方法与宪政主义背道而驰，与公认的权利法案诉讼观念不相容。